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Abstract
We introduce the use of Fourier analysis on lattices as an integral part of a lattice based
construction. The tools we develop provide an elegant description of certain Gaussian distri-
butions around lattice points. Our results include two cryptographic constructions which are
based on the worst-case hardness of the unique shortest vector problem. The main result is a
new public key cryptosystem whose security guarantee is considerably stronger than previous
results (O(n1.5) instead of O(n7)). This provides the first alternative to Ajtai and Dwork’s
original 1996 cryptosystem. Our second result is a family of collision resistant hash functions
which, apart from improving the security in terms of the unique shortest vector problem, is also
the first example of an analysis which is not based on Ajtai’s iterative step. Surprisingly, both
results are derived from one theorem which presents two indistinguishable distributions on the
segment [0, 1). It seems that this theorem can have further applications and as an example we
mention how it can be used to solve an open problem related to quantum computation.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic constructions based on lattices have attracted considerable interest in recent years.
The main reason is that, unlike many other cryptographic constructions, lattice based constructions
can be based on the worst-case hardness of a problem. That is, breaking them would imply a
solution to any instance of a certain lattice problem. In this paper we will be interested in the
unique shortest vector problem (uSVP), a lattice problem which is believed to be hard: we are
asked to find the shortest vector in an n-dimensional lattice with the promise that it is shorter by a
factor of nc than all other non-parallel vectors. Hence, the problem becomes harder as c decreases.
The results in this field can be divided into two types. The first includes public key cryptosystems
and the second includes families of collision resistant hash functions.
The only previously known public key cryptosystem based on a worst-case lattice problem
is the one due to Ajtai and Dwork [2] which appeared in 1996. They presented a public key
cryptosystem based on the worst-case hardness of O(n8)-uSVP. Then, in [8], Goldreich, Goldwasser
and Halevi showed how to eliminate decryption errors that existed in the original scheme. They
also improved the security to O(n7)-uSVP. Although there are other lattice based cryptosystems
(see, e.g., [9, 10, 13]), none of them is based on the worst-case hardness of a lattice problem. Our
main result is a new public key cryptosystem whose security is based on O(n1.5)-uSVP.
∗EECS Department, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720. Email: odedr@cs.berkeley.edu. Most of this work was
done while the author was at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ. Work supported by the Army Research
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In [1], Ajtai presented a family of one-way hash functions based on the worst-case hardness of
several lattice problems. In terms of the uSVP, it was based on the hardness of O(nc)-uSVP. The
constant c was not explicitly specified but later it was noted to be c = 19 [4]. In [7], it was shown
that under the same assumptions one can obtain a family of collision resistant hash functions.
This is a stronger primitive than a one-way function with many uses in cryptography. Cai and
Nerurkar [5] improved the exponent to c = 9+ ǫ and later, by providing an improved analysis, Cai
[4] obtained c = 4 + ǫ. These papers also showed how to base the security of the hash function on
other lattice problems which are potentially harder than uSVP (e.g., GapSVP and GapSIVP). In
[15], Micciancio recently constructed a family of hash functions with the best known constant c for
several important lattice problems (but not for uSVP). In another paper [14], Micciancio improved
the efficiency of the hash function by using cyclic lattices. Roughly speaking, all of these results
are based on variations of a method known as Ajtai’s iterative step.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of Fourier analysis on lattices as an inte-
gral part of a lattice based construction. Fourier analysis was previously used indirectly through
transference theorems, i.e., theorems that relate properties of a lattice and its dual (see, e.g., [4]).
Our constructions are the first to use Fourier analysis directly.
Our main theorem is a reduction from the O(n1.5)-uSVP to the problem of distinguishing
between two types of distributions on the segment [0, 1). We believe that this theorem will find
other uses in the future.
Using the main theorem, we present three results. The main one is a new public key cryp-
tosystem which is based on the hardness of O(n1.5)-uSVP. This is a major improvement to the
1996 cryptosystem by Ajtai and Dwork. Its description is surprising in that it essentially consists
only of numbers modulo some large number N . Our second result is a family of collision resistant
hash functions whose security is based on the O(n1.5)-uSVP. In terms of the uSVP, this improves
all the previous results mentioned above. However, previous results were not based only on uSVP
and are therefore incomparable with our result. In addition, ours is the first lattice based hash
function whose analysis is not based on Ajtai’s iterative step. The hash function that we consider
is simple and is known as the modular subset sum function1. This function already appeared in
previous papers; for example, one of the results in [11] is an average-case to average-case reduction
for the function. The third result is related to an open question in quantum computation and will
be discussed in Section 7.
Intuitive overview
In the following we provide an informal overview of the results in this paper. Many of the details
are omitted for the sake of clarity.
Main theorem: Our main theorem is a reduction from O(n1.5)-uSVP to the problem of distin-
guishing between two types of distributions on [0, 1). One distribution is the uniform distribution U
while the other Th is concentrated around integer multiples of 1/h for some unknown large integer
1Previous constructions of hash functions were usually presented as functions on random lattices. However, most
of these results can be easily extended to the modular subset sum function. This was already noted in Ajtai’s original
paper ([1]).
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h ≤ 2O(n2) (notice that if we knew h we could easily distinguish between the two). The sharpness
of the concentration in this ‘wavy’ distribution depends on the factor of the uSVP problem. For
example, O(n1.5)-uSVP translates to a concentration of around 1/n, that is, the difference between
two adjacent peaks is roughly n times the width of a peak (see Figure 1). Notice that the reduction
is to a worst-case problem in the sense that one has to distinguish between the uniform distribution
and the wavy distribution for all values h in a certain range. Nevertheless, the wavy distribution
has the property that if one distinguishes it from uniform for some small fraction of h then one can
also distinguish it from uniform for all values of h. This average-case to worst-case property will
be implicit in our cryptographic applications. In the following we describe the three steps in the
proof of the main theorem.
The first step involves a reduction from the search problem uSVP to a certain decision problem
on lattices. Assume that the shortest vector is
∑n
i=1 aivi where ai ∈ Z and v1, . . . , vn is a basis
of the lattice. The decision problem asks whether p | ai where p is some prime number which we
choose to be slightly more than n1.5. The reduction is a Cook reduction and the idea is to make the
lattice sparser and sparser without losing the shortest vector. At the end, the lattice is so sparse
that we can easily find the shortest vector. For example, when p | ai we can replace vi with p · vi
without losing the shortest vector. The actual proof is slightly more involved as we have to handle
cases where p ∤ ai.
The second step is the core of the proof. Here, we reduce the above decision problem to a
problem of distinguishing between two n-dimensional distributions. Namely, one distribution is
uniform and the other is a ‘wavy’ distribution. We begin by developing a few lemmas based on a
theorem of Banaszczyk. Essentially, this theorem says that if we choose a ‘random’ lattice point
from the dual L∗ of a lattice and perturb it by a Gaussian of radius
√
n then the distribution
obtained can be closely approximated by a function that depends only on points in L (the primal
lattice) that are within distance
√
n of the origin. We apply this theorem for two types of lattices
L. The first is a lattice L where all nonzero vectors are of length more than
√
n. Here we get that
the distribution around points of L∗ is determined only by the origin of the primal lattice and is
therefore very close to being uniform. The second type is a lattice with one short vector u of length
(say) 1/n and all other non-parallel vectors of length more than
√
n. The distribution that we
obtain here is almost uniform on n − 1 dimensional hyperplanes orthogonal to u. In the direction
of u the distribution has peaks of distance n such that the width of each peak is 1. The way we
use these results is the following. Recall that we are given an n1.5-unique lattice and we should
decide whether p | ai. We do this by first scaling the lattice so that the length of the shortest
vector is 1/n and therefore all non-parallel vectors are of length more than n1.5/n =
√
n. We then
multiply vi by p. If p | ai then the shortest vector remains in the lattice and therefore if we take
the distribution in the dual lattice we get a wavy distribution as described above. Otherwise, if
p ∤ ai, the shortest vector disappears and since p > n
1.5 the resulting lattice has no vectors shorter
than
√
n. Therefore, the distribution obtained in the dual is very close to uniform.
The third and final step consists of ‘projecting’ the n-dimensional distributions described above
onto a one-dimensional distribution. Na¨ıvely, one can choose a point according to the n-dimensional
distribution and project it down to a line. However, this would ruin the original distribution. We
would like to project down to a line but only from tiny areas around the line. This would guarantee
that the original distribution is preserved. This, however, presents a new difficulty: how can one
guarantee that a randomly selected point according to the distribution in Rn falls close to the
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line? We solve this by using the fact that the distribution is periodic on the lattice. Hence it
is enough to consider the distribution on the fundamental parallelepiped of the lattice. Now we
can draw a line that passes through the parallelepiped many times and that is therefore ‘dense’ in
the n-dimensional space inside the parallelepiped (see Figure 2). Projecting the two n-dimensional
distributions above will produce either the uniform distribution U or the wavy distribution Th for
some h. This completes the description of the main theorem.
Public key cryptosystem: Let N be some large integer. The private key consists of a single
integer h chosen randomly in the range (say) [
√
N, 2
√
N). The public key consists of m = O(logN)
numbers a1, . . . , am in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} which are ‘close’ to integer multiples of N/h (notice that h
doesn’t necessarily divide N). We also include in the public key an index i0 ∈ [m] such that ai0 is
close to an odd multiple of N/h. We encrypt one bit at a time. An encryption of the bit 0 is the
sum of a random subset of {a1, . . . , am} modulo N . An encryption of the bit 1 is similar but we
add ⌊ai0/2⌋ to the result. On receiving an encrypted word w we consider its remainder on division
by N/h. If it is small, we decrypt 0 and otherwise we decrypt 1. Notice that since a1, . . . , am are
all close to integer multiples of N/h any encryption of 0 is also close to a multiple of N/h and the
decryption is correct. Similarly, since ⌊ai0/2⌋ is far from a multiple of N/h, encryptions of 1 are
also far from multiples of N/h and the decryption is 1.
The following is a rough description of how we establish the security of the cryptosystem.
Assume that there exists a distinguisher A that given the public key can distinguish encryptions of
0 from encryptions of 1. In other words, the difference between the acceptance probabilities p0 on
encryptions of 0 and the acceptance probability p1 on encryptions of 1 is non-negligible. Therefore,
if pu is the acceptance probability on random words w, it must be the case that either |pu − p0| or
|pu − p1| is non-negligible. Assume that the former case holds (the latter case is similar). Then we
construct a distinguisher between the distributions U and Th. Let R be the unknown distribution
on [0, 1). We choose m values from R, multiply them by N and round the result. Let a1, . . . , am
be the result. We then estimate A’s acceptance probability when the public key a1, . . . , am (for
simplicity we ignore i0) is fixed and the word w is chosen randomly as an encryption of 0. This
is done by simply calling A many times, each time with a new w computed according to the
encryption algorithm. We also estimate A’s acceptance probability when w is chosen uniformly
from {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and not according to the encryption algorithm. If there is a non-negligible
difference between the two estimates, we decide that R is Th and otherwise we say that R is U .
We claim that this distinguishes between U and Th. If R is U then a1, . . . , am are uniform in
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. One can show that this implies that the distribution of encryptions of 0 is very
close to the uniform distribution and therefore A (as well as any other algorithm) cannot have
different acceptance probabilities for the two distributions. Otherwise, R is Th and the distribution
that we obtain on a1, . . . , am is the same one that is used in the public key algorithm. Therefore,
according to our hypothesis, A should have a non-negligible difference between the two cases.
A family of collision resistant hash functions: We choose m = O(logN) random numbers
a1, . . . , am uniformly from {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and define the hash function f(b) =
∑m
i=1 biai mod N
where b ∈ {0, 1}m. A collision finding algorithm in this case means an algorithm A that given
random a1, . . . , am finds with non-negligible probability a nonzero vector b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m such that∑
biai ≡ 0(mod N). Using A we show how to build a distinguisher between U and Th. By trying
many values of the form (1+1/poly(m))i we can have an estimate h˜ of h up to some small 1/poly(m)
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error. We would like to use h˜ to check if the distribution is concentrated around multiples of 1h .
Sampling values from the unknown distribution R and reducing modulo 1/h˜ does not help because
the difference between i/h and i/h˜ is much larger than 1/h˜ for almost all 0 ≤ i < h (recall that
h is roughly
√
N which is exponential in m). The idea is to use the collision finding algorithm to
create from Th a distribution which is also concentrated around the peaks i · 1h but only for i ≤ m.
We sample m values x1, . . . , xm from the unknown distribution R. We add small perturbations
y1, . . . , ym chosen uniformly in [0, 1/h˜) to each x1, . . . , xm respectively. We denote the result by
z1, . . . , zm. Now we call A with ⌊N · z1⌋, . . . , ⌊N · zm⌋ and we get a subset S such that
∑
i∈S zi mod 1
is very close to zero. For simplicity assume that it is exactly zero. We then check if
∑
i∈S xi mod 1 =
−∑i∈S yi mod 1 is close to an integer multiple of 1/h˜. If R is the uniform distribution on [0, 1) then
conditioned on any values of z1, . . . , zm the distribution of y1, . . . , ym is still uniform in [0, 1/h˜) and
hence
∑
i∈S yi is not close to an integer multiple of 1/h˜. If R is Th then conditioned on any values
of z1, . . . , zm, the xi’s are distributed around one or two peaks of Th. Therefore,
∑
i∈S xi mod 1 is
close to a multiple of 1h . Moreover, since the yi’s are at most 1/h˜, their sum is at most m/h˜. Since
the estimate h˜ satisfies that for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i/h is very close to i/h˜, the distinguisher can reduce∑
i∈S xi modulo 1/h˜ and see that it is close to a multiple of 1/h˜, as required.
One last issue that we have to address is that A might not find collisions on inputs of the form
⌊N · z1⌋, . . . , ⌊N · zm⌋ when R is not the uniform distribution. This is because our assumption was
that A finds collisions on inputs chosen uniformly. But if A does not find collisions we know that
R has to be Th and hence we can still distinguish between U and Th.
Outline
In Section 2 we list several definitions and some properties of lattices that will be needed in this
paper (for an introduction to lattices see [16]). After defining several distributions in Section 2.1 we
present the two cryptographic constructions in Section 3. The main theorem is developed in Section
4. The analysis of the public key cryptosystem is in Section 5 and that of the hash function is in
Section 6. In Section 7 we present a solution to an open problem related to quantum computation.
Several technical claims appear in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
A lattice in Rn is defined as the set of all integer combinations of n linearly independent vectors.
This set of vectors is known as a basis of the lattice and is not unique. Given a basis (v1, . . . , vn)
of a lattice L, the fundamental parallelepiped is defined as
P(v1, . . . , vn) = {
n∑
i=1
xivi | xi ∈ [0, 1)}.
When the basis is clear from the context we will use the notation P(L) instead of P(v1, . . . , vn).
Note that a lattice has a different fundamental parallelepiped for each possible basis. We denote
by d(L) the volume of the fundamental parallelepiped of L or equivalently, the determinant of the
matrix B whose columns are the basis vectors of the lattice. The point x ∈ Rn reduced modulo
the parallelepiped P(v1, . . . , vn) is the unique point y ∈ P(v1, . . . , vn) such that y − x is an integer
combination of v1, . . . , vn (see, e.g., [13]). The dual of a lattice L in R
n, denoted L∗, is the set of
all vectors y ∈ Rn such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ Z for all vectors x ∈ L. Similarly, given a basis (v1, . . . , vn)
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of lattice, we define the dual basis as the set of vectors (v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
n) such that 〈vi, v∗j 〉 = δij for all
i, j ∈ [n]. Note that if B = (v1, . . . , vn) is the n × n matrix whose columns are the basis vectors
then (BT )−1 contains the dual basis as its columns. From this it follows that d(L∗) = 1/d(L).
We say that a lattice is unique if its shortest vector is strictly shorter than all other non-parallel
vectors. Moreover, a lattice is f(n)-unique if the shortest vector is shorter by a factor of at least
f(n) from all non-parallel vectors. In the shortest vector problem we are interested in finding the
shortest vector in a lattice. In this paper we will be interested in the f(n)-unique shortest vector
problem (f(n)-uSVP) where in addition, we are promised that the lattice is f(n)-unique. Let λ(L)
denote the length of the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice L. We also denote the shortest vector
(or one of the shortest vectors) by τ(L). Most of the lattices that appear is this paper are unique
lattices and in these cases τ(L) is unique up to sign.
One particularly useful type of basis is an LLL reduced basis. Such a basis can be found in
polynomial time [12]. Hence, we will often assume without loss of generality that lattices are given
by an LLL reduced basis. The properties of LLL reduced bases that we use are summarized in
Claim A.8.
We define a negligible amount as an amount which is asymptotically smaller than n−c for any
constant c > 0. The parameter n will indicate the input size. Similarly, a non-negligible amount
is one which is at least n−c for some c > 0. Finally, exponentially small means an expression that
is at most 2−Ω(n). We say that an algorithm A with oracle access is a distinguisher between two
distributions if its acceptance probability when the oracle outputs samples of the first distribution
and its acceptance probability when the oracle outputs samples of the second distribution differ by
a non-negligible amount. Note that the notion of acceptance is used for convenience. In addition,
an algorithm A is said to distinguish between the distribution T and the set of distribution T if
for any distribution T ′ ∈ T , A distinguishes between T and T ′.
For two continuous random variables X and Y having values in [0, 1) with density functions T1
and T2 respectively we define their statistical difference as
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
|T1(r)− T2(r)|dr.
A similar definition holds for discrete random variables. One important fact that we use is that
the statistical distance cannot increase by applying a (possibly randomized) function f , i.e.,
∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≤ ∆(X,Y ), (1)
see, e.g., [16]. In particular, this implies that the acceptance probability of any algorithm on inputs
from X differs from its acceptance probability on inputs from Y by at most ∆(X,Y ).
The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n]. All logarithms are of base 2 unless otherwise specified.
We use δij to denote the Kronecker delta, i.e., 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. We use c˜ to denote an
unspecified constant. That is, whenever c˜ appears we can replace it with some universal constant.
For example, the expression c˜+ 7 = c˜ is true because we can substitute 1 and 8 for the constants.
Other constants will be denoted by c with a letter as the subscript, e.g., ch.
For two real numbers x, y > 0 we define x mod y as x − ⌊x/y⌋y. For x ∈ R we define ⌊x⌉ as
the integer nearest to x or, in case two such integers exist, the smaller of the two. We also use the
notation frc(x) := |x− ⌊x⌉|, i.e., the distance of a real x to the nearest integer. Notice that for all
x, y ∈ R, 0 ≤ frc(x) ≤ 12 , frc(x) ≤ |x| and frc(x+ y) ≤ frc(x) + frc(y).
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Recall that the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2 is the distribution on R given
by the density function 1√
2pi·σe
− 1
2
( x
σ
)2 . Also recall that the sum of two normal variables with mean
0 and variances σ21 and σ
2
2 is a normal variable with mean 0 and variance σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 . A simple tail
bound on the normal distribution appears in Claim A.1. The Gaussian distribution is a distribution
on Rn obtained by taking n independent identically distributed normal random variables as the
coordinates. We define the standard Gaussian distribution as the distribution obtained when each
of the normal random variables has standard deviation 1/
√
2π. In other words, a standard Gaussian
distribution is given by the density function e−pi‖x‖
2
on Rn.
For clarity, we present some of our reductions in a model which allows operations on real
numbers. It is possible to modify them in a straightforward way so that they operate in a model that
approximates real numbers up to an error of 2−nc for arbitrary large constant c in time polynomial
in n. Therefore, if we say that two continuous distributions on [0, 1) are indistinguishable (in the
real model) then for any c > 0 discretizing the distributions up to error 2−n
c
for any c yields two
indistinguishable distributions.
2.1 Several Distributions
We define several useful distributions on the segment [0, 1). The distribution U is simply the
uniform distribution with the density function U(r) = 1. For β ∈ R+ the distribution Qβ is a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance β2pi reduced modulo 1 (i.e., a periodization of the
normal distribution):
Qβ(r) =
∞∑
k=−∞
1√
β
e−
pi
β
(r−k)2 .
Clearly, one can efficiently sample from Qβ by sampling a normal variable and reducing the result
modulo 1. Another distribution is Th,β where h ∈ N and β ∈ R+ (see Figure 1). Its density function
is defined as
Th,β(r) = Qβ(rh mod 1) =
∞∑
k=−∞
1√
β
e−
pi
β
(rh−k)2 .
By adding a normalization factor we can extend the definition of Th,β to non-integer h. So in
general,
Th,β(r) =
1∫ 1
0 Qβ(xh mod 1)dx
Qβ(rh mod 1).
For a real h > 0, choosing a value z ∈ [0, 1) according to Th,β can be done as follows. First choose
a value x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌈h⌉−1} and then choose a value y according to Qβ. If x+yh < 1 then return it
as the result. Otherwise, repeat the process again. It is easy to see that the distribution obtained
is indeed Th,β and that the process is efficient for (say) h ≥ 1.
We also define the following set of distributions:
Tn,g := {Th,β | h ∈ N, h ≤ 2chn2 , β ∈ [ n
g2
, 4
n
g2
)}
where ch is a constant specified in Lemma 4.9.
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Figure 1: T4,0.05, T7,0.05 and T4,0.02
3 Cryptographic Constructions
For a security parameter n, let N be 2cNn
2
and let m be cmn
2 where cN and cm are two constants
which will be specified later. Let γ(n) = ω(n
√
log n), i.e., any function that satisfies γ(n)
n
√
logn
→ ∞
as n goes to infinity. The smaller the function, the better the security guarantee becomes. For
concreteness, one can choose γ(n) = n log n. We also assume that γ(n) ≤ ncγ for some constant
cγ > 0.
Public Key Encryption
• Private key: Let H = {h ∈ [√N, 2√N) | frc(h) < 116m}. Choose h ∈ H uniformly at
random. Let d denote Nh . The private key is the number h.
• Public Key: Choose β ∈ [4 1(γ(n))2 , 8 1(γ(n))2 ) uniformly at random. We choose m values
z1, . . . , zm from Th,β by choosing x1, . . . , xm and y1, . . . , ym as described in Section 2.1. Let
i0 be an index such that xi0 is odd (such an i0 exists with probability exponentially close to
1). For i ∈ [m], let ai denote ⌊N · zi⌋. The public key is (a1, . . . , am, i0).
• Encryption: In order to encrypt a bit we choose a random subset S of [m]. The encryption
is
∑
i∈S ai mod N if the bit is 0 and
∑
i∈S ai + ⌊
ai0
2 ⌋ mod N if the bit is 1.
• Decryption: On receiving w ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} we decrypt 0 if frc(wd ) < 14 and 1 otherwise.
A Family of Collision Resistant Hash Functions
• Choose m numbers a1, . . . , am uniformly in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The function f : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} is defined as:
f(b) =
m∑
i=1
biai mod N.
Notice that if cm > cN then f indeed compresses the size of the input and collisions are
guaranteed to exist.
4 Main Theorem
In this section we present a reduction from g(n)-uSVP to the problem of distinguishing between
two types of distributions on [0, 1).
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Theorem 4.1 Let g(n) be any function such that 4
√
n ≤ g(n) ≤ poly(n) and let ch the constant
specified in Lemma 4.9. If there exists a distinguisher between U and Tn,g(n) then there exists a
solution to g(n)-uSVP.
Proof: Let p(n) be a prime larger than g(n) and at most (say) 2g(n). We can now apply Lemmas
4.2, 4.8 and 4.9 in order to obtain the theorem.
4.1 Reduction to a Decision Problem
We reduce the SVP to the following decision problem:
Decision SVP with parameter p (dSV Pp)
• Input: An arbitrary basis (v1, . . . , vn) of a unique lattice L and a number α such that
λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L) and let τ(L) =∑ni=1 aivi be the coefficients of the shortest vector.
• Output: YES if p divides a1, NO otherwise.
Lemma 4.2 Let p = p(n) > 2 be a prime number which is at most polynomial in n.2 There exists
a reduction from finding the shortest vector in a unique lattice L to dSV Pp.
3 Moreover, if L is an
f(n)-unique lattice then all the calls to dSV P are also with an f(n)-unique lattice.
Proof: It is convenient to have a bound on the coefficients of the shortest vector. So we assume,
without loss of generality, that we are given a basis (v1, . . . , vn) of L which is LLL reduced. Hence,
by Claim A.8, we get that the coefficients of the shortest vector satisfy |ai| ≤ 22n and ‖v1‖2n ≤
λ(L) ≤ ‖v1‖. These are the only properties that we need from the basis and in fact, other bases
used throughout this proof will not necessarily be LLL reduced. In the following we describe a
procedure B(α) that finds the shortest vector given an estimate α which satisfies λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L).
We apply the procedure n times with α = 2j−n · ‖v1‖ for j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. Notice that when we
call B with the wrong value of α it can error by either outputting a non-lattice vector or a lattice
vector which is longer than the shortest vector. We can easily ignore these errors by checking that
the returned vector is a lattice vector and then take the shortest one. Therefore, it is sufficient to
show that when α satisfies λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L), B(α) returns the shortest vector. Clearly, one can
modify the dSV P so that it finds whether p | ai for any i ∈ [n] (and not just i = 1) by simply
changing the order of the vectors in the basis given to the dSV P .
The procedure B is based on changes to the basis (v1, . . . , vn). Throughout the procedure we
maintain the invariant that the lattice spanned by the current basis is a sublattice of the original
lattice and that the shortest vector is unchanged. Notice that this implies that if the original
lattice is an f(n)-unique lattice then all intermediate lattices are also f(n)-unique and hence all
the calls to dSV P are with an f(n)-unique lattice, as required. In addition, since the shortest
vector is unchanged, the estimate α can be used whenever we call the dSVP with an intermediate
lattice. The changes to the basis are meant to decrease the coefficients of the shortest vector. We
let a1, . . . , an denote the coefficients of the shortest vector according to the current basis. We will
show that when the procedure ends all the coefficients of the shortest vector are zero except ai for
2The result holds for the case p = 2 as well with some technical differences.
3One can guarantee the uniqueness of the shortest vector in any lattice by adding tiny perturbations to the basis
vectors. Therefore, the assumption that L is unique can be avoided.
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some i ∈ [n]. This implies that the shortest vector is vi. In the following we describe a routine C
that will later be used in B.
The routine C(i, j) where i, j ∈ [n] applies a sequence of changes to the basis. Only the vectors
vi and vj in the basis are modified. When the routine finishes it returns the new basis and a bit. If
the bit is zero then we are guaranteed that the coefficient ai of the shortest vector in the new basis
is zero. Otherwise, the bit is one and we are guaranteed that |aj | ≤ 12 |ai| and that ai is nonzero.
In any case, the value of |ai| does not increase by C(i, j).
The routine is composed of the following two steps. In the first step we replace vi with p · vi as
long as the dSV P says that p | ai and not more than 2n times. By multiplying vi by p when p | ai,
we obtain a sublattice that still contains the same shortest vector. The coefficient ai decreases by
a factor of p. Since we began with |ai| < 22n, if this happens 2n times then ai = 0 and therefore in
this case we return the current lattice and output a zero bit. Otherwise, we are guaranteed that in
the current lattice p ∤ ai.
In the second step we consider p different bases where vi is replaced with one of vi−p−12 vj , . . . , vi−
vj , vi, vi + vj , . . . , vi +
p−1
2 vj. Notice that all p bases span the same lattice. Also note that the co-
efficient aj changes to aj +
p−1
2 ai, . . . , aj + ai, aj , aj − ai, . . . , aj − p−12 ai respectively while all other
coefficients remain the same. Since p ∤ ai, one of the bases must satisfy that p | aj and we can find
it by calling dSV Pp. We choose that basis and then multiply vj by p. We repeat the above steps
(of choosing one of the p bases and multiplying by p) 2n times and then output the resulting lattice
with the bit one. With each step, the new |aj| becomes at most (p−12 |ai|+|aj |)/p = (12− 12p)|ai|+
|aj |
p .
Hence, after 2n applications, the new |aj | is at most (12− 12p)(1+ 1p+. . .+ 1p2n−1 )|ai|+
|aj |
p2n
< 12 |ai|+
|aj|
p2n
and since aj is integer this implies |aj | ≤ 12 |ai|. This completes the description of C. It is easy to
check that all the numbers involved have a polynomial size representation and therefore C runs in
polynomial time.
The procedure B works by maintaining a set Z of possibly non-zero coefficients which is initially
set to [n]. As long as |Z| ≥ 2 we perform the following operations. Assume without loss of generality
that 1, 2 ∈ Z. We alternatively call C(1, 2) and C(2, 1) until the bit returned in one of the calls is
zero. This indicates that one of the coefficients is zero (either a1 or a2 depending on which call
returns the zero bit) and we remove it from the set Z. In order to show that the procedure runs in
polynomial time, it is enough to show that an element is removed from Z after at most a polynomial
number of steps. Notice that after each pair of calls to C that returned the bit one |a1| decreases
by a factor of at least 4. Therefore, after at most 2n calls to C, a1 becomes zero and C(1, 2) must
return the bit zero.
Although not used in this paper, the following is an immediate corollary of the above lemma
and might be of independent interest. Basically, it is a reduction from the search SVP to the
decision SVP for unique lattices. It is still an open question whether a similar result holds for SVP
on general lattices.
Corollary 4.3 For any prime p = p(n) < poly(n) larger than 2 and any f(n) ≥ 1, finding the
shortest vector in an p(n)f(n)-unique lattice can be reduced to the following gap problem: given d
and an f(n)-unique lattice, decide whether the length of the shortest vector is at most d or more
than
√
p(n) · d.
Proof: According to Lemma 4.2 it is enough to describe a solution to dSV Pp on p · f(n)-unique
lattices. Say we are given the lattice L with the basis (v1, . . . , vn). By using the gap problem we can
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approximate λ(L) and λ(L′) up to a factor
√
p where L′ is the lattice spanned by (pv1, v2, . . . , vn).
Notice that since p · τ(L) ∈ L′, L′ is an f(n)-unique lattice, as required. Say that λ(L) ∈ [d1,√pd1]
and λ(L′) ∈ [d2,√pd2]. If p | a1 then both lattices contain the same shortest vector and therefore
the two ranges intersect. Otherwise, it is easy to see that τ(L′) = p · τ(L) and therefore the two
ranges do not intersect.
4.2 Gaussian Distributions on Lattices
Let Bn denote the Euclidean unit ball and define ρ(A) as
∑
x∈A e
−pi‖x‖2 . The following lemma by
Banaszczyk says that in any lattice L the contribution to ρ(L) from points of distance more than√
n is negligible.
Lemma 4.4 ([3], Lemma 1.5(i) with c = 1) For any lattice L, ρ(L−√nBn) < 2−Ω(n)ρ(L).
The proof of this lemma is not straightforward; a somewhat easier proof can be found in
Sˇtefankovicˇ’s thesis [18]. A simple corollary of this lemma is that ρ(L) < ρ(L∩√nBn)/(1−2−Ω(n)).
We will also use the following formulation of the Poisson summation formula:
Lemma 4.5 ([3], Lemma 1.1(i) with a = π, b = 1, y = 0) For any lattice L and any vector y ∈
Rn, ρ(L∗ + y) = d(L) ·∑x∈L e2pii〈x,y〉ρ({x}).
For a given lattice L, we consider the distribution obtained by sampling a standard Gaussian
centered around the origin and reducing it modulo the fundamental parallelepiped P(L∗). Equiv-
alently, we consider the following density function defined on P(L∗):
DL∗(x) = ρ(L
∗ + x).
Intuitively, we can think of DL∗ as taking Gaussian distributions around ‘all’ points of L
∗. Since
this distribution is periodic in Rn with period P(L∗), we simplify the analysis by choosing DL∗ to
be a restriction of the distribution to P(L∗). In this section we present good approximations to
DL∗ for two types of lattices L.
Lemma 4.6 Let L be a lattice in which all non-zero vectors are of length more than
√
n and let
UL∗(x) =
1
d(L∗) = d(L) be the uniform density function on P(L∗). Then, ∆(DL∗ , UL∗) < 2−Ω(n).
Proof: For any y ∈ Rn,
|1−
∑
x∈L
e2pii〈x,y〉ρ({x})| ≤
∑
x∈L\√nBn
ρ({x}) =
ρ(L \ √nBn)
{1}
< 2−Ω(n)ρ(L)
{2}
< 2−Ω(n)
ρ(L ∩ √nBn)
1− 2−Ω(n) ≤ 2
−Ω(n)
where {1} and {2} are due to Lemma 4.4 and the last inequality holds because ρ(L ∩ √nBn) = 1.
Multiplying by d(L) and using Lemma 4.5 we get,
|d(L)− ρ(L∗ + y)| < 2−Ω(n)d(L).
We conclude the proof by integrating over P(L∗),
∆(DL∗ , UL∗) < 2
−Ω(n).
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For any vector v ∈ L define the density function TL∗,v on P(L∗) as
TL∗,v(x) =
d(L)
‖v‖
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+〈v,x〉‖v‖ )2 .
According to Claim A.5 it is indeed a density function.
Lemma 4.7 Let L be a lattice with a shortest vector u in which all vectors not parallel to u are of
length more than
√
n. Then, ∆(DL∗ , TL∗,u) < 2
−Ω(n)(1 + 1‖u‖). In particular, if ‖u‖ ≥ 1nc for some
c > 0 then ∆(DL∗ , TL∗,u) < 2
−Ω(n).
Proof: For any y ∈ Rn,∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈L
e2pii〈x,y〉ρ({x})−
∑
k∈Z
e2piik〈u,y〉ρ({ku})
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∑
x∈L\√nBn
ρ({x}) = ρ(L \ √nBn)
{1}
< 2−Ω(n)ρ(L)
{2}
≤ 2−Ω(n) 1
1− 2−Ω(n) ρ({ku|k ∈ Z}) ≤
2−Ω(n)ρ({ku|k ∈ Z})
{3}
≤ 2−Ω(n)(1 + 1‖u‖)
where {1} and {2} are due to Lemma 4.4 and {3} is due to Claim A.2 with x = 0. By multiplying
by d(L) we get
|ρ(L∗ + y)− d(L)
∑
k∈Z
e2piik〈u,y〉ρ({ku})| < 2−Ω(n)(1 + 1‖u‖) · d(L). (2)
Consider the one dimensional lattice M spanned by the number ‖u‖. Clearly, the lattice M∗ is
spanned by the number 1‖u‖ . According to Lemma 4.5 for any a ∈ R,
ρ(M∗ + a) = d(M)
∑
b∈M
e2piiabρ({b}) = ‖u‖
∑
k∈Z
e2piika‖u‖ρ({ku}).
Therefore, taking a = 〈u, y〉/‖u‖,
d(L)
∑
k∈Z
e2piik〈u,y〉ρ({ku}) = d(L)‖u‖ ρ(M
∗ +
〈u, y〉
‖u‖ ) = TL∗,u(y)
We conclude the proof by integrating (2) over P(L∗):
∆(DL∗ , TL∗,u) < 2
−Ω(n)(1 +
1
‖u‖).
4.3 Two Indistinguishable Distributions
Lemma 4.8 Let g(n) < p(n) be such that p(n) is a prime and both are at most polynomial in n.
Solving dSV Pp(n) on g(n)-unique lattices can be reduced to the problem of distinguishing between
UL∗ and TL∗,τ(L) where L is given as an LLL reduced basis and λ(L) ∈ [
√
n
g(n) ,
2
√
n
g(n) ).
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Proof: We are given a basis (v1, . . . , vn) of a g(n)-unique lattice L and a number α such that
λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L). Let L′ be the lattice L scaled by a factor 2
√
n
α·g(n) , i.e., the lattice spanned by the
basis (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) :=
2
√
n
α·g(n)(v1, . . . , vn). Notice that in L
′ the shortest vector τ(L′) =
∑n
i=1 aiv
′
i is
of length in [
√
n
g(n) ,
2
√
n
g(n) ) and any vector not parallel to τ(L
′) is of length at least g(n) ·
√
n
g(n) =
√
n.
Now, let M be the lattice spanned by the basis (p(n)v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n). If p(n) | a1 then τ(M) = τ(L′)
and therefore its length is in [
√
n
g(n) ,
2
√
n
g(n) ). Also, since M ⊆ L′, any vector in M not parallel to τ(M)
is of length at least
√
n. If p(n) ∤ a1 then the shortest multiple of τ(L
′) that is contained in M is
p(n) · τ(L′) whose length is at least p(n) ·
√
n
g(n) >
√
n. Hence, in this case all non-zero vectors are of
length at least
√
n.
Clearly, we can take an LLL reduced basis of the lattice M without changing the properties of
the lattice described above. Now consider the distribution DM∗ . We can efficiently sample from it
by sampling a Gaussian centered around the origin with standard deviation 1√
2pi
and reducing it
modulo P(M∗). According to Lemma 4.7, if p(n) | a1 then the distribution is exponentially close
to TM∗,τ(M). On the other hand, if p(n) ∤ a1, Lemma 4.6 says that the distribution is exponentially
close to the uniform distribution UM∗ . Therefore, we can decide with non-negligible probability
if p(n) | a1 by calling an algorithm that distinguishes between TM∗,τ(M) and UM∗ . The error
probability can be made exponentially small by calling the algorithm a polynomial number of
times and taking the majority.
4.4 One Dimensional Distributions
Lemma 4.9 There exists a constant ch such that for any g(n) ≥ 4
√
n, g(n) ≤ poly(n), the problem
of distinguishing between UL∗ and TL∗,τ(L) for a lattice L given as an LLL reduced basis for which
λ(L) ∈ [
√
n
g(n) ,
2
√
n
g(n) ) can be reduced to the problem of distinguishing between U and Tn,g(n).
Proof: Let v1, . . . , vn denote the LLL reduced basis of L and let v
∗
1 , . . . , v
∗
n be the dual basis
of L∗, i.e., a basis of L∗ such that 〈vi, v∗j 〉 = δij . For some large integer K to be chosen later,
consider a function f which maps a vector v =
∑n
i=1 aiv
∗
i in P(L∗) to ⌊Ka1⌋K + ⌊Ka2⌋K2 + . . . +
⌊Kan−1⌋
Kn−1 +
an
Kn ∈ [0, 1). An equivalent way to describe f is the following. For a real r ∈ [0, 1) let
r1, . . . , rn−1 ∈ {0, 1K , . . . , K−1K } and rn ∈ [0, 1) be the unique numbers such that r = r1 + 1K r2 +
. . .+ 1Kn−2 rn−1 +
1
Kn−1 rn. The set of points that are mapped to r is given by
S(r) := {
n∑
i=1
aiv
∗
i | ∀i ∈ [n− 1] ai ∈ [ri, ri +
1
K
] and an = rn}.
Hence, S(r) is an n− 1 dimensional parallelepiped whose diameter is at most 1K
∑n−1
i=1 ‖v∗i ‖. Let w
denote the vector v∗1 +Kv
∗
2 + . . .+K
n−1v∗n. Then, it is easy to see that for any r ∈ [0, 1) the point
rw reduced modulo P(L∗) is contained in S(r). The line connecting the origin with w reduced
modulo P(L∗) goes through the parallelepiped Kn−1 times. The mapping f essentially takes each
point in P(L∗) to a nearby point on the line (see Figure 2).
The reduction works by sampling a point from the given distribution on P(L∗) and applying f ,
thereby obtaining a distribution on [0, 1). Notice that f can be computed efficiently. Clearly, by
starting from a uniform distribution on P(L∗) we obtain the uniform distribution on [0, 1). Hence,
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Figure 2: The line connecting the origin to w with K = 4 in two dimensions with P(v1, v2) and in
three dimensions with the unit cube.
it is enough to consider TL∗,τ(L). The distribution that we get on [0, 1) is given by:
T1(r) :=
d(L∗)
vol(S(r))
∫
S(r)
TL∗,τ(L)(x)dx
which is d(L∗) times the average of TL∗,τ(L) over S(r). We claim that by choosing K to be large
enough this average is very close to its value in rw ∈ S(r). More formally, we claim that T1(r) is
exponentially close to
T|〈τ(L),w〉|,λ(L)2(r) =
1
λ(L)
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+r〈τ(L),w〉
λ(L)
)2
= d(L∗)TL∗,τ(L)(rw)
where in the first equality we used the fact that 〈τ(L), w〉 is integer and that the function does not
change if we change the sign of 〈τ(L), w〉.
By using the mean value theorem we get that for any r ∈ [0, 1) the difference between the
maximum and the minimum values of TL∗,τ(L) over S(r) is at most:
diam(S(x)) ·max
x
d
dx
(
d(L)
λ(L)
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+λ(L)x
λ(L)
)2
) ≤ c˜ · 1
K
n−1∑
i=1
‖v∗i ‖ ·
d(L)
λ(L)
where the inequality is due to Claim A.3 and the assumption that λ(L) ≤ 2
√
n
g(n) ≤ 12 . Hence, using
Claim A.8,
∀r ∈ [0, 1)
∣∣T1(r)− T|〈τ(L),w〉|,λ(L)2(r)∣∣ ≤ d(L∗) · c˜ · 1K
n−1∑
i=1
‖v∗i ‖ ·
d(L)
λ(L)
= c˜ · 1
K
n−1∑
i=1
‖v∗i ‖ ·
1
λ(L)
≤ c˜ · 1
K
· n ·
√
n
λ(L)
· 22n · 1
λ(L)
≤ c˜ · 1
K
· 22n · poly(n)
and by choosing K = 23n we get that the statistical distance between T1 and T|〈τ(L),w〉|,λ(L)2 is
exponentially small.
Recall that w =
∑n
i=1K
i−1v∗i and τ(L) =
∑n
i=1 aivi where all |ai| ≤ 22n. Since 〈vi, v∗j 〉 = δij ,
the inner product 〈τ(L), w〉 is integer and its absolute value is at most n · 22n ·Kn ≤ 2chn2 for a
large enough ch, as required.
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5 Analysis of the Public Key Cryptosystem
Lemma 5.1 (Correctness) The probability of a decryption error is at most 2−Ω(
(γ(n))2
m
) plus some
exponentially small terms.
Note that the above probability is negligible since γ(n) = ω(n
√
log n).
Proof: First consider an encryption of the bit 0. Probabilities are taken over the choices of the
private and public keys and the randomization in the encryption process. Let S denote the subset
of indices which are included in the sum and let w :=
∑
i∈S ai mod N . Since
∑
i∈S ai ≤ m ·N ,∣∣∣∣∣w − (
∑
i∈S
ai mod d⌊h⌉)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ m · |N − d⌊h⌉| = m · d · frc(h) <
1
16
d
and by the triangle inequality,
frc(
w
d
) <
1
16
+ frc(
∑
i∈S ai mod d⌊h⌉
d
) =
1
16
+ frc(
∑
i∈S ai
d
) <
1
16
+
m
d
+ frc(
N
d
∑
i∈S
zi)
where the last inequality uses |N · zi − ai| < 1. Notice that frc(Nd
∑
i∈S zi) = frc(
∑
i∈S(xi + yi)) =
frc(
∑
i∈S yi). Hence,
frc(
w
d
) <
1
16
+
m
d
+ frc(
∑
i∈S
yi) <
1
8
+ frc(
∑
i∈S
yi)
where we used the fact that d is much larger than m. With probability exponentially close to 1,
all xi’s are strictly less than ⌈h⌉ − 1. Conditioned on that, the distribution of yi is Qβ and the
distribution of
∑
i∈S yi mod 1 is Q|S|β where |S|β ≤ m · β = O( m(γ(n))2 ). Therefore, according to
Claim A.1, the probability of frc(
∑
i∈S yi) >
1
16 is at most 2
−Ω(γ(n)
m
) and hence
frc(
w
d
) <
1
8
+
1
16
(3)
which is less than 14 , as required.
The proof for the case of an encryption of 1 is similar. By using the fact that xi0 is odd and
that with probability exponentially close to 1, frc(yi0) <
1
16 we get frc(
⌊ai0/2⌋
d ) >
1
2 − 132 − 1d . This,
combined with (3) gives
frc(
w
d
) > frc(
⌊ai0/2⌋
d
)− 1
8
− 1
16
>
1
4
and the proof is completed.
Before establishing the security of the construction, let us prove a few simple claims.
Claim 5.2 For any h ∈ N, β ∈ R, let X,Y be two independent random variables; X is distributed
uniformly over {0, 1h , . . . , h−1h } and Y is normal with mean 0 and variance β2pih2 . Then Th,β is
equivalent to the distribution of the sum of X and Y reduced modulo 1.
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Proof:
Th,β(r) = Qβ(hr mod 1) =
∞∑
k=−∞
1√
β
e
−pi
β
(hr−k)2
=
h−1∑
l=0
∞∑
k=−∞
1√
β
e
−pi
β
(hr−hk−l)2
=
h−1∑
l=0
1
h
∞∑
k=−∞
h√
β
e
−pih2
β
(r−k− l
h
)2
Claim 5.3 For h ∈ N, Th,β +Qδ mod 1 = Th,β+δh2.
Proof: According to Claim 5.2, Th,β can be viewed as the sum of two random variables X and Y
reduced modulo 1. Therefore, Th,β +Qδ mod 1 = X + Y + Qδ mod 1. But since both Y and Qδ
are normal, their sum modulo 1 is exactly Q β
h2
+δ
and we conclude the proof by using Claim 5.2
again.
Definition 5.4 Given a density function X on [0, 1) we define its compression by a factor δ ≥ 1
as the distribution on [0, 1) given by
1∫ 1
0 X(δx mod 1)dx
X(δr mod 1).
We denote the result by Cδ(X).
Using the above definition, Th,β is a compression of Qβ by a factor of h. Notice that if we can
sample efficiently from X then we can also sample efficiently from its compression. This is done in
a way similar to that used to sample from Th,β.
Claim 5.5 For any h ∈ N and δ ≥ 1, the compression of Th,β by a factor δ is Tδh,β.
Proof: The proof follows directly from the definition of Th,β.
Claim 5.6 For large enough c, when choosing c · l numbers a1, . . . , ac·l uniformly from 0 to 2l − 1
the probability that the statistical distance between the uniform distribution on {0, . . . , 2l − 1} and
the distribution given by sums modulo 2l of random subsets of {a1, . . . , ac·l} is more than 2−l is at
most 2−l.
Proof: Let Xt,b for t ∈ {0, . . . , 2l−1}, b ∈ {0, 1}c·l\0c·l denote the event that
∑c·l
i=1 biai ≡ t (mod 2l)
where the probability is taken over the choice of {a1, . . . , ac·l}. Then, E[Xt,b] = 2−l and V [Xt,b] <
2−l. Hence, E[Yt] = 2
c·l−1
2l
= 2(c−1)·l − 2−l where Yt denotes
∑
b∈{0,1}c·l\0c·l Xt,b. Moreover, for
b 6= b′, the events Xt,b and Xt,b′ are pairwise disjoint. Therefore, V [Yt] < 2c·l−12l < 2(c−1)·l. Using
the Chebyshev inequality,
Pr
(∣∣∣Yt − (2(c−1)·l − 2−l)
∣∣∣ ≥ 2( c−12 +1)·l) ≤ 2−2l
and hence,
Pr
(∣∣∣Yt − 2(c−1)·l
∣∣∣ ≥ 2( c−12 +1)·l + 2−l) ≤ 2−2l.
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Using the union bound,
Pr
(
∃t,
∣∣∣Yt − 2(c−1)·l
∣∣∣ ≥ 2( c−12 +1)·l + 2−l) ≤ 2−l.
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 2−l on the choice of {a1, . . . , ac·l}, the number of subsets
(including the empty subset) mapped to each number t is at most 2(
c−1
2
+1)·l + 2−l + 1 ≤ 2( c−12 +2)·l
away from 2(c−1)·l. This translates to a statistical distance of at most
2(
c−1
2
+2)·l · 2−(c−1)·l < 2−l
for large enough c.
Lemma 5.7 (Security) For cN ≥ 2ch and large enough cm, if there exists a polynomial time
algorithm A that distinguishes between encryptions of 0 and 1 then there exists an algorithm B that
distinguishes between the distributions U and Tn,√nγ(n).
Proof: Let p0 be the acceptance probability of A on input ((a1, . . . , am, i0), w) where w is an
encryption of 0 with the public key (a1, . . . , am, i0) and the probability is taken over the choice of
private and public keys and the encryption algorithm. We define p1 similarly for encryptions of 1
and let pu be the acceptance probability of A on inputs ((a1, . . . , am, i0), w) where a1, . . . , am, i0 are
again chosen according to the private and public keys distribution but w is chosen uniformly from
{0, . . . , N −1}. We would like to construct an A′ that distinguishes between the case where w is an
encryption of 0 and the case where w is random. According to our hypothesis, |p0 − p1| ≥ 1nc for
some c > 0. Therefore, either |p0 − pu| ≥ 12nc or |p1 − pu| ≥ 12nc . In the former case A is itself the
required distinguisher. In the latter case A distinguishes between the case where w is an encryption
of 1 and the case where w is random. We construct A′ as follows. On input ((a1, . . . , an, i0), w),
A′ calls A with ((a1, . . . , an, i0), w + ⌊ai02 ⌋ mod N). Notice that this maps the distribution on
encryptions of 0 to the distribution on encryptions of 1 and the uniform distribution to itself.
Therefore, A′ is the required distinguisher.
Let p0(a1, . . . , am, i0) be the probability that A′ accepts on inputs ((a1, . . . , am, i0), w) where
the probability is taken only over the choice of w as an encryption of 0 with the fixed public key
(a1, . . . , am, i0). Similarly, define pu(a1, . . . , am, i0) to be the acceptance probability of A′ where w
is now chosen uniformly at random from {0, . . . , N − 1}. Define
Y =
{
(a1, . . . , am, i0)
∣∣∣∣ |p0(a1, . . . , am, i0)− pu(a1, . . . , am, i0)| ≥ 14nc
}
.
By an averaging argument we get that with probability at least 14nc on the choice of (a1, . . . , am, i0),
(a1, . . . , am, i0) ∈ Y for otherwise A′ would have a gap of less than 12nc .
In the following we describe the distinguisher B. We are given a distribution R which is either
U or some Th,β ∈ Tn,√nγ(n) with an integer h ≤ 2chn
2 ≤ √N and a real β ∈ [ 1
(γ(n))2
, 4 1
(γ(n))2
).
Note that neither h nor β are given to B. Our goal is to construct B such that the acceptance
probability with U and the acceptance probability with Th,β differ by a non-negligible factor. We
first choose h˜ uniformly from the set {1, 2, 4, . . . ,√N}. In addition we choose δ uniformly from the
range [
√
N/h˜, 4
√
N/h˜) and s uniformly from the range [0, 7 1(γ(n))2 ). Then, consider the distribution
R′ = Cδ(R+Qδ2s/N mod 1), i.e., we first add a normal variable to R and then compress the result
by a factor of δ. We take m samples a1, . . . , am from ⌊N · R′⌋ and let i0 be chosen randomly
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from [m]. We estimate p0(a1, . . . , am, i0) and pu(a1, . . . , am, i0) by computing many values w either
according to the encryption algorithm or randomly and then calling A′. By using a polynomial size
sample, we can estimate the two probabilities up to an error of at most 132nc . If the two estimates
differ by more than 14nc , B accepts. Otherwise, B rejects.
We first claim that when R is the uniform distribution, B rejects with high probability. The
distribution R + Qδ2s/N mod 1 is still a uniform distribution on [0, 1) and so is R
′ as can be
easily seen from the definition of the compression. Therefore, a1, . . . , am are chosen uniformly from
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and according to Claim 5.6 if cm is a large enough constant then with probability
exponentially close to 1, the distribution on w obtained by encryptions of 0 is exponentially close
to the uniform distribution on {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Therefore, since A′ can be seen as a function on
w, |p0(a1, . . . , am, i0)− pu(a1, . . . , am, i0)| is also exponentially small and B rejects.
Now assume that R is the distribution Th,β for some fixed h and β and we claim that B accepts
with non-negligible probability. Then, according to Claim 5.3, R +Qδ2s/N mod 1 is Th,β+(δh)2s/N .
Hence, according to Claim 5.5, R′ is Tδh,β+(δh)2s/N . Let X denote the event that h ≤ h˜ < 2h,
δh ∈ [√N, 2√N), frc(δh) < 116m and β + (δh)2s/N ∈ [4 1(γ(n))2 , 8 1(γ(n))2 ). We now show that
the probability on our choice of h˜, δ, s that X happens is at least 1poly(n) . First, with probability
1
log(
√
N)
= 2
cNn2
, h ≤ h˜ < 2h. Now, δh is uniformly distributed in [h/h˜ ·√N, 4h/h˜ ·√N). Therefore,
conditioned on h ≤ h˜ < 2h, the probability that δh ∈ [√N, 2√N) is at least 13 . Moreover,
conditioned on h ≤ h˜ < 2h and δh ∈ [√N, 2√N), the probability that frc(δh) < 116m is 18m . For
any fixed δh ∈ [√N, 2√N), (δh)2/N ∈ [1, 4) and therefore β + (δh)2s/N is distributed uniformly
in [β, β+(δh)2/N · 7
(γ(n))2
). The length of this range is at most 4 · 7
(γ(n))2
and it always contains the
range [4 1
(γ(n))2
, 8 1
(γ(n))2
) (because β ∈ [ 1
(γ(n))2
, 4 1
(γ(n))2
)). Therefore, the probability on the choice
of s that β + (δh)2s/N ∈ [4 1
(γ(n))2
, 8 1
(γ(n))2
) is at least 428 =
1
7 . To sum up, the probability of X is
at least 2cNn2 ·
1
3 · 17 · 18m = 1poly(n) .
Notice that conditioned on X, the distribution of δh and β + (δh)2/N is the same as the
distribution of h and β in the choice of the private and public keys. Therefore the probability that
(a1, . . . , am, i0) ∈ Y is at least
Pr(X) · Pr (∃i0, (a1, . . . , am, i0) ∈ Y | X) · 1
m
≥ Pr(X) · 1
4nc
· 1
m
=
1
poly(n)
.
But when (a1, . . . , am, i0) ∈ Y ,
|p0(a1, . . . , am, i0)− pu(a1, . . . , am, i0)| ≥ 1
4nc
and therefore our estimates are good enough and B accepts.
By combining the two lemmas above we get,
Theorem 5.8 For cN ≥ 2ch and large enough cm, the public key cryptosystem described in Section 3
makes decryption errors with negligible probability and its security is based on
√
n · γ(n)-uSVP.
6 Analysis of the Collision Resistant Hash Function
Claim 6.1 Let X1, . . . ,Xm be m independent normal random variables with mean 0 and standard
deviation σ. For any vector b ∈ Rm, the random variable ∑mi=1 biXi has a normal distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation ‖b‖ · σ.
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Proof: The joint distribution (X1, . . . ,Xm) is a Gaussian distribution in R
m which is invariant
under rotations. Hence we can equivalently consider the inner product of (‖b‖, 0, . . . , 0) and a
Gaussian distribution. We complete the proof by noting that the first coordinate of the Gaussian
has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ.
Definition 6.2 For any h ∈ Z, h˜, β ∈ R and any a ∈ [0, 1) we define the following two density
functions on [0, 1):
Sh˜,h,β,a(r) :=
1
h˜
∫ a+1/h˜
a Th,β(x)dx
Th,β(a+
r
h˜
)
S′h,β,a(r) := Th,β(a+
r
h
) = Qβ(a · h+ r mod 1).
Claim 6.3 If h ≤ h˜ < (1+ δ)h where h ∈ Z, h˜ ∈ R, δ > 0 and β ≤ 14 then ∆(Sh˜,h,β,a, S′h,β,a) ≤ c˜β δ.
Proof: According to Claim A.2, Th,β(x) = Qβ(hx mod 1) ≤ (1 +
√
β)/
√
β ≤ 2/√β for any x ∈ R.
Therefore,
∫ a+1/h
a
−
∫ a+1/h˜
a
Th,β(x)dx ≤ 2√
β
(
1
h
− 1
h˜
) =
2√
β · h˜(
h˜
h
− 1) ≤ 2δ√
β · h˜
But
∫ a+1/h
a Th,β(x)dx =
1
h and therefore we see that
h˜
h
− h˜
∫ a+1/h˜
a
Th,β(x)dx ≤ 2δ√
β
.
Let S′′
h˜,h,β,a
(r) := Th,β(a+ r/h˜). Then,
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣Sh˜,h,β,a(r)− S′′h˜,h,β,a(r)
∣∣∣dr =
∣∣∣∣∣1− h˜
∫ a+1/h˜
a
Th,β(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ·
∫ 1
0
Sh˜,h,β,a(r)dr =
∣∣∣∣∣1− h˜
∫ a+1/h˜
a
Th,β(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣1−
h˜
h
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
h˜
h
− h˜
∫ a+1/h˜
a
Th,β(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1 +
2√
β
)δ
Now, using the mean value theorem for any r ∈ [0, 1),
∣∣∣S′h,β,a(r)− S′′h˜,h,β,a(r)
∣∣∣ ≤ ( 1
h
− 1
h˜
)max
x
∣∣∣∣ ddxTh,β(x)
∣∣∣∣ = (1h −
1
h˜
)max
x
∣∣∣∣∣
d
dx
∞∑
k=−∞
1√
β
e
−pi( h√
β
x− 1√
β
k)2
∣∣∣∣∣
which, according to Claim A.3 using 1√
β
≥ 2 > 1√
2pi
+ 1, is at most
(
1
h
− 1
h˜
) · c˜√
β
· h√
β
=
c˜
β
(1− h
h˜
) ≤ c˜
β
δ.
To sum up,
2∆(Sh˜,h,β,a, S
′
h,β,a) ≤
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣Sh˜,h,β,a(r)− S′′h˜,h,β,a(r)
∣∣∣dr +
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣S′h,β,a(r)− S′′h˜,h,β,a(r)
∣∣∣dr
≤ ( c˜
β
+ 1 +
2√
β
)δ ≤ c˜
β
δ.
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Theorem 6.4 For cN ≥ 2ch and any cm ≥ 0, if there exists an algorithm A that given a list
a1, . . . , am ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} finds a nonzero vector b ∈ Zm such that ‖b‖ ≤
√
m and
∑m
i=1 biai ≡
0(mod N) with probability at least n−ca where ca > 0 is some constant then there exists a solution
to
√
n · γ(n)-uSVP.
Note that in particular, if b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m then ‖b‖ ≤ √m and hence this theorem includes collision
finding algorithms.
Proof: According to Theorem 4.1 it is enough to construct a distinguisher B between U and
Tn,√n·γ(n). The distinguisher B works by calling the routine C described below n times with each
value h˜ = (1 + n−ch˜)i, i ∈ [log
1+n
−c
h˜
N ]. The constant c
h˜
will be specified later. If there exists an
h˜ for which all n calls to C accept, B accepts. Otherwise, for any h˜ there exists one call where C
rejects and B rejects.
The routine C(h˜) samplesm values x1, . . . , xm from the given distribution which we denote by R.
It also chooses m values y1, . . . , ym uniformly in [0, 1/h˜). Let zi = xi − yi mod 1 and ai = ⌊N · zi⌋.
We call A with a1, . . . , am. If A fails we repeat the process again (choosing xi, yi and calling A). If
after nca+1 calls A still fails, C accepts. Otherwise, we have a vector b ∈ Zm such that ‖b‖ ≤ √m
and
∑m
i=1 biai ≡ 0(mod N). The routine C(h˜) accepts if frc(
∑m
i=1 bih˜yi) <
1
4 and rejects otherwise.
First we show that if R is the uniform distribution then for any h˜, C(h˜) accepts with probability
roughly 12 . From this it will follow that the probability that n calls to C(h˜) accept is exponen-
tially small, i.e., B rejects with probability exponentially close to 1. Each number xi is uniform
in [0, 1) and so is zi. Therefore, each ai is uniform in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and according to our as-
sumption, A succeeds with probability at least n−ca . The probability that nca+1 calls fail is at
most (1 − n−ca)nca+1 < e−n which is exponentially small. In order to bound the probability that
frc(
∑m
i=1 bih˜yi) <
1
4 we use the fact that A is oblivious to the decomposition of the zi’s into xi− yi
and would work equally well if zi = x
′
i − y′i for some other x′i,y′i. Consider the following equivalent
way to create the joint distribution of xi, yi, zi: we first choose the zi’s uniformly in [0, 1) and then
choose yi uniformly in [0, 1/h˜) and choose xi to be zi + yi mod 1. Hence, conditioned on any
values for the zi’s, the distribution of the yi’s is uniform in [0, 1/h˜) and therefore frc(
∑m
i=1 bih˜yi) is
distributed uniformly in [0, 12). The probability that frc(
∑m
i=1 bih˜yi) <
1
4 is therefore
1
2 , as required.
Now consider the case that R is Th,β where β ≤ 4(γ(n))2 . We claim that when h˜ is the smallest
such that h˜ ≥ h, C(h˜) rejects with probability at most c˜mn2cγ−ch˜ . Therefore, the probability that
B sees a rejection after n calls is at most c˜mn2cγ−ch˜+1 and it therefore accepts with probability
close to 1 if we choose a large enough c
h˜
. Notice that such an h˜ satisfies h ≤ h˜ < (1 + n−ch˜)h.
As before, we create the joint distribution of xi, yi, zi by first choosing zi and then yi. This would
allow us to use the fact that A is oblivious to the decomposition of zi to xi− yi. So we first choose
the zi’s from their unconditional distribution and then consider the distribution of yi conditioned
on zi given by:
1∫ zi+1/h˜
zi
Th,β(x)dx
Th,β(zi + r) ∀r ∈ [0, 1
h˜
).
Hence the density function of the distribution of h˜ · yi is exactly Sh˜,h,β,zi. According to Claim 6.3
the statistical distance between Sh˜,h,β,zi and S
′
h,β,zi
is at most c˜βn
−c
h˜ ≤ c˜n2cγ−ch˜ . Let ξ1, . . . , ξm
be m random variables chosen independently according to Qβ. Notice that the distribution of
the random variable ξi − h · zi is exactly S′h,β,zi. Hence, according to Claim A.6 the statistical
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distance between the joint distributions (h˜ · y1, . . . , h˜ · ym) and (ξ1 − h · z1, . . . , ξm − h · zm) is at
most c˜m · n2cγ−ch˜ . Now,
m∑
i=1
bi(ξi − h · zi) mod 1 =
m∑
i=1
biξi −
m∑
i=1
bi · h · zi mod 1
According to Claim 6.1,
∑m
i=1 biξi has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
‖b‖ ·
√
β
2pi ≤
√
mβ
2pi ≤
√
2m
pi(γ(n))2
= o( 1√
logn
). Therefore, according to Claim A.1, the probability that
frc(
∑m
i=1 biξi) >
1
8 is negligible. Now,
frc(
m∑
i=1
bi · h · zi) = frc(
m∑
i=1
h
N
biN · zi) ≤ frc(
m∑
i=1
h
N
biai) +
m∑
i=1
h
N
· bi =
m∑
i=1
h
N
· bi ≤ m · h
N
· √m.
Therefore, except with negligible probability,
frc(
m∑
i=1
bi(ξi − h · zi)) ≤ 1
8
+m · h
N
√
m <
1
4
where we used the fact that h ≤ 2chn2 ≤ √N . This implies that the probability that frc(∑mi=1 bih˜yi) <
1
4 is at most c˜m · n2cγ−ch˜ plus some negligible amount.
7 Quantum Computation
In this section we show a result related to a problem in quantum computation known as the
dihedral hidden subgroup problem. One reason this problem is interesting is because, under certain
conditions, solving it implies a quantum solution to uSVP [17]. In [6], Ettinger and Høyer reduced
the problem to the problem of finding an integer k given access to the distribution Zk where
Pr(Zk = z) = 2/N · cos2(πkz/N) for z = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. They presented an exponential time
classical algorithm that uses only a polynomial number of samples of Zk. Hence, a polynomial
number of samples contains enough information to find k. The question of whether there exists an
efficient algorithm remained open. In this section we will show that a solution to their problem
implies a solution to nc-uSVP for some c.
We start by extending Theorem 4.1 to more general periodic distributions. Let D be a distribu-
tion on [0, 1) such that its density function satisfies D(r) ≤ cD and |D(r)−D(r + ǫ mod 1)| ≤ cDǫ
for all r, ǫ ∈ [0, 1) for some constant cD. For h ∈ N, define
TDh (r) = D(rh mod 1)
to be the distribution on [0, 1) given by h periods of D. Moreover, define
T Dn =
{
TDh | h ∈ N, h ≤ 2chn
2
}
.
where ch is the constant from Lemma 4.9 and n is the size parameter of the problem.
Lemma 7.1 If there exists a distinguisher between U and T Dn then there exists a solution to nc-
uSVP for some c > 0.
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Proof: Assume A is a distinguisher between U and T Dn and assume that it uses ncA samples of
the given distribution for some cA > 0. Let pu denote the acceptance probability of A on inputs
from distribution U and for h ∈ N let ph denote its acceptance probability on inputs from TDh .
According to our hypothesis |pu − ph| ≥ n−cd for all h ∈ [2chn2 ] for some constant cd > 0.
We construct a distinguisher B between U and Tn,nc for some large enough c > 0. The lemma
then follows from Theorem 4.1. Let R denote the given distribution. First, B chooses a value h˜
uniformly from the set {1, 1 + µ, (1 + µ)2, . . . , 2chn2} where µ = n−cµ for some constant cµ > 0 to
be chosen later. Then, define the distribution R′ as
R′ = R+
D
h˜
mod 1,
i.e., a sample from R′ is given by x+ r/h˜ mod 1 where x is chosen from R and r is chosen from D.
It then estimates the acceptance probability of A using sequences of samples from R′ each of length
ncA . According to the Chernoff bound, using a polynomial number of sequences, we can obtain
an estimate that with probability exponentially close to 1 is within 14ncd of the actual acceptance
probability. If the estimate differs from pu by more than
1
2ncd , B accepts; otherwise, it rejects. This
completes the description of B.
When R is the uniform distribution then R′ is also the uniform distribution. Therefore, with
probability exponentially close to 1, B’s estimate is within 14ncd of pu and B rejects. Hence, it is
remains to show that B accepts with some non-negligible probability when R is Th,β where h ≤ 2chn2
and β ≤ n−cβ for some large enough cβ.
Consider the event in which h ≤ h˜ < (1 + µ)h. Notice that it happens with non-negligible
probability since h˜ is chosen from a set of size polynomial in n. The following claim will complete
the proof by showing that the statistical distance between R′ and TDh is smaller than n
−cA−cd/4.
Using Claim A.6, it follows that the statistical distance between a sequence of ncA elements of R′
and a sequence of ncA elements of TDh is at most n
−cd/4. Finally, using Equation 1, this implies that
A’s success probability on sequences from R′ is within n−cd/4 from ph and since |pu − ph| ≥ n−cd ,
B accepts.
Claim 7.2 For h˜ as above and for large enough cβ and cµ, the statistical distance ∆(R
′, TDh ) ≤
n−cA−cd/4.
Proof: Consider the distribution R′′ given by
R′′ = Th,β +
D
h
.
The distribution R′′ can be seen as a random function of the distribution D: given a value r ∈ D
sample a value x from Th,β and output x + r/h. Notice that R
′ is given by applying the same
function to the distribution (h/h˜)D. Hence, using Equation 1,
∆(R′, R′′) ≤ ∆(D, h
h˜
D) =
∫ h/h˜
0
|D(r)−D( h˜
h
r)|dr +
∫ 1
h/h˜
D(r)dr
≤ cD(1− h
h˜
) + (1− h
h˜
)cD
≤ 2cDµ = 2cDn−cµ . (4)
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We next bound the statistical distance between TDh and R
′′. Let X be a random variables
distributed uniformly over {0, 1h , . . . , h−1h }. Then, it can be seen that
TDh = X +
D
h
mod 1.
Now, let Y be another random variable distributed normally with mean 0 and variance β2pi . Then,
as in Claim 5.2, Th,β = X + Y/h mod 1 and hence,
R′′ = X +
Y
h
+
D
h
mod 1.
Therefore, TDh can be seen as a random function applied to a sample from
D
h while R
′′ can be seen
as the same function applied to a sample from Yh +
D
h . From Equation 1 it follows that
∆(TDh , R
′′) ≤ ∆
(
1
h
D,
1
h
(D + Y )
)
= ∆(D,D + Y ). (5)
Let Y ′ be the restriction of a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance β2pi to the range
[−n√β, n√β]. More formally,
Y ′(r) = Y (r)/
∫ n√β
−n√β
Y (r)dr
for r ∈ [−n√β, n√β] and Y ′(r) = 0 elsewhere. From Claim A.1 it follows that the distribution of
Y is very close to that of Y ′:
∆(Y, Y ′) ≤
√
2
π
· 1
n
√
2π
· e−pin2 = 2−Ω(n2). (6)
Now, using the fact that Y ′ always gets values of small absolute value,
∣∣D(r)− (D + Y ′)(r)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣D(r)−
∫ n√β
−n√β
D(r − x)Y ′(x)dx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∫ n√β
−n√β
|D(r)−D(r − x)|Y ′(x)dx
≤ cDn
√
β
∫ n√β
−n√β
Y ′(x)dx
= cDn
√
β.
Since both D(r) and (D + Y ′)(r) are zero for r < −n√β and for r > 1 + n√β,
∆(D,D + Y ′) =
∫ 1+n√β
−n√β
∣∣D(r)− (D + Y ′)(r)∣∣ dr
≤ (1 + 2n
√
β) · cDn
√
β
≤ (1 + 2n1−cβ/2) · cDn1−cβ/2 ≤ 2cDn1−cβ/2 (7)
for large enough cβ . Finally, combining Equations 4, 5, 6, 7 and using the triangle inequality, we
obtain
∆(R′, TDh ) ≤ 2cDn−cµ + 2−Ω(n
2) + 2cDn
1−cβ/2 ≤ n−cA−cd/4
for large enough cβ and cµ.
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This completes the proof of Lemma 7.1.
We can now prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 7.3 For k ∈ N, k < N , define the distribution Zk by Pr(Zk = z) = 2/N · cos2(πkz/N)
for z = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Assume there exists an algorithm A that given a polynomial (in logN)
number of samples from Zk, returns k with probability exponentially close to 1. Then, there exists
a solution to nc-uSVP for some c.
We remark that it is possible to relax the assumptions of the theorem. It is enough if the algorithm
returns k with non-negligible probability. Also, it is enough if the algorithm finds k only for some
non-negligible fraction of all possible k’s.
Proof: Let D be the distribution on [0, 1) given by D(r) = 2 cos2(πr). An easy calculation shows
that the absolute value of its derivative is at most 4π. Therefore, it satisfies the conditions stated
before Lemma 7.1 with cD = 4π. Using Lemma 7.1, it is enough to show how to distinguish between
U and T Dn .
Given an unknown distribution R, let R′ be the distribution given by ⌊N ·R⌋ where N is chosen
to be large enough, say, 22chn
2
. We call A with enough samples from R′ and obtain a value k.
Finally, we take one sample r from R and accept if frc(rk) < 1/4 and reject otherwise.
First, consider the case where R is the uniform distribution. Then no matter which value of k
we obtain, the probability that frc(rk) < 1/4 is exactly 1/2. Now consider the case where R is TDh
for some h ≤ 2chn2 . For any r = 0, . . . , N − 1, the probability that R′ = r is given by
∫ (r+1)/N
r/N
D(hx mod 1)dx =
∫ (r+1)/N
r/N
2 cos2(πhx)dx.
From the bound on the derivative of D mentioned above, we obtain that the distance of this integral
from 2/N · cos2(πhr/N) is at most 4π2h/N2. Therefore, the statistical distance between R′ and Zh
is
∆(Zh, R
′) ≤ N
2
· 4π2h/N2 = 2−Ω(n2).
Since the number of samples given to A is only polynomial in n, its input is still within statistical
distance 2−Ω(n2) of Zh and it therefore outputs h with probability exponentially close to 1. Then,
the probability that frc(rk) < 1/4 is given by
∫ 1/4
−1/4
2 cos2(πr)dr =
1
2
+
1
π
.
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A Several Technical Claims
Claim A.1 The probability that the distance of a normal variable with variance σ2 from its mean
is more than t is at most
√
2
pi · σt e−
t2
2σ2 .
Proof:∫ ∞
t
1√
2πσ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx ≤
∫ ∞
t
(1 +
σ2
x2
)
1√
2πσ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx = − 1√
2πσ
· σ
2
x
e−
x2
2σ2
∣∣∣∣
∞
x=t
=
σ√
2πt
e−
t2
2σ2 .
Claim A.2
∀x, r ∈ R,
∑
k∈Z
e−pi(kr+x)
2 ≤ 1 + 1
r
Proof: Let k′ ∈ Z be such that |kr + x| is minimized. Then,
∑
k∈Z
e−pi(kr+x)
2 ≤ 1 +
∑
k∈Z\{k′}
e−pi(kr+x)
2
= 1 +
1
r
∑
k∈Z\{k′}
r · e−pi(kr+x)2 ≤
1 +
1
r
∫ ∞
−∞
e−piy
2
dy = 1 +
1
r
where changing the sum to an integral is possible because the sum can be seen as the area under
a function that lies completely below e−piy2 .
Claim A.3 For any a, x ∈ R and any b > 1√
2pi
+ 1,
∣∣∣ ddx∑k∈Z e−pi(bk+ax)2
∣∣∣ ≤ c˜a
Proof: Let z denote a · x. Then,∣∣∣∣∣
d
dx
∑
k∈Z
e−pi(bk+ax)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ = a
∣∣∣∣∣
d
dz
∑
k∈Z
e−pi(bk+z)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
a
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈Z
−2π(bk + z)e−pi(bk+z)2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
a
∑
k∈Z
∣∣∣2π(bk + z)e−pi(bk+z)2∣∣∣
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In the following we will upper bound
∑
k∈{0,1,...}
∣∣∣2π(bk + y)e−pi(bk+y)2 ∣∣∣
where y ∈ [0, b]. The upper bound for the original expression is clearly at most 2a times this value.
The function |2πye−piy2 | is increasing from 0 to 1√
2pi
where it attains the maximum value of
√
2πe.
After that point it is monotonically decreasing. Hence,
∑
k∈N
∣∣∣2π(bk + y)e−pi(bk+y)2 ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣2πye−piy2 ∣∣∣+ ∑
k∈{1,2,...}
∣∣∣2π(bk + y)e−pi(bk+y)2∣∣∣ ≤
√
2πe+
∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣2πye−piy2∣∣∣dy = √2πe+ 1
where changing from summation to integration is possible because b ≥ 1 and because the function
is decreasing from 1√
2pi
and the first y in the sum is at least 1√
2pi
+ 1.
Claim A.4 Let L be a lattice and let f : Rn → R be periodic on L, i.e., f(x) = f(x + y) for all
x ∈ Rn and y ∈ L. Then, for any two bases v1, . . . , vn and u1, . . . , un of L,∫
P(v1,...,vn)
f(x)dx =
∫
P(u1,...,un)
f(x)dx.
Proof: One can get from one basis of a lattice to any other by a finite sequence of operations of
the following two types: replace vector vi by −vi and replace vector vi by vi + vj for some i 6= j.
Hence, it is enough to show that the integral is invariant under these two operations. Define the
following ‘half’ parallelepipeds:
P1 = {
n∑
i=1
αivi | αi ∈ [0, 1), α2 ≥ α1}
P2 = {
n∑
i=1
αivi | αi ∈ [0, 1), α2 < α1}
P3 = {
n∑
i=1
αivi + v2 | αi ∈ [0, 1), α2 < α1}
Note that P(v1, . . . , vn) is equal to P1 ∪P2 and P(v1 + v2, v2, . . . , vn) = P1 ∪P3. But since P3 is a
shift of P2 by v2 ∈ L,∫
P(L)
f(x)dx =
∫
P1
+
∫
P2
f(x)dx =
∫
P1
+
∫
P3
f(x)dx =
∫
P(v1+v2,v2,...,vn)
f(x)dx.
A similar argument shows that the integral is invariant under negation of basis vectors.
Claim A.5 For any vector v ∈ L,∫
P(L∗)
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+〈v,x〉‖v‖ )2dx = ‖v‖d(L∗).
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Proof: Define
f(x) :=
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+〈v,x〉‖v‖ )2 .
Notice that for any w ∈ L∗, f(x) = f(x + w) since 〈v,w〉 ∈ Z and hence f is periodic on L∗.
Consider the basis for L∗ given by any basis of the lattice L∗ ∩ v⊥ and any vector w in L∗ such
that 〈w, v〉 = 1. Let P denote the corresponding parallelepiped. Then, using Claim A.4,
∫
P(L∗)
f(x)dx =
∫
P
f(x)dx =
1
‖v‖
∫ 1
0
∫
P∩{y|〈y,v〉=a}
f(x)dx da
=
1
‖v‖
∫ 1
0
∫
P∩{y|〈y,v〉=a}
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+a‖v‖ )2dx da
=
1
‖v‖
∫ 1
0
‖v‖d(L∗) ·
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+a‖v‖ )2da
= d(L∗)
∫ 1
0
∑
k∈Z
e
−pi(k+a‖v‖ )2da = d(L∗)
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−pi( a‖v‖ )2da = ‖v‖d(L∗).
Claim A.6 Let X1, . . . ,Xm, Y1, . . . , Ym be mutually independent random variables. Then the sta-
tistical distance between the joint distributions satisfies
∆((X1, . . . ,Xm), (Y1, . . . , Ym)) ≤
m∑
i=1
∆(Xi, Yi).
Proof: We consider the case m = 2. The claim follows for m > 2 by induction. According to the
triangle inequality,
∆((X1,X2), (Y1, Y2)) ≤ ∆((X1,X2), (X1, Y2)) + ∆((X1, Y2), (Y1, Y2)).
Since X1 is independent of X2 and Y2,
∆((X1,X2), (X1, Y2)) = ∆(X2, Y2)
and similarly
∆((X1, Y2), (Y1, Y2)) = ∆(X1, Y1).
Properties of an LLL reduced basis
Claim A.7 Let B = (bi,j)1≤i,j≤n be an n × n upper triangular matrix such that for all i < j ≤ n,
|bi,j| ≤ |bi,i|. Then, the entries of (BT )−1 have an absolute value of at most 1mini |bi,i|2n.
Proof: First, let D denote the diagonal matrix with values bi,i on the diagonal. Then B can
be written as MD where M is an upper triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal and all
other entries have an absolute value of at most 1. Then, (BT )−1 = (DTMT )−1 = (MT )−1D−1.
Therefore, it is enough to show that the entries of L := (MT )−1 have absolute values of at most 1.
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The diagonal of L is all ones and it is lower triangular. The entry li,j for i > j can be recursively
defined by −∑j≤k<i lk,jmk,i. Therefore,
|li,j | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j≤k<i
lk,jmk,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j≤k<i
|lk,jmk,i| ≤
∑
j≤k<i
|lk,j|
from which we get the bound |li,j | ≤ 2i−j for i ≥ j.
Claim A.8 Let (v1, . . . , vn) be an LLL-reduced basis of a lattice L and let
∑n
i=1 aivi be its shortest
vector. Then |ai| ≤ 22n for all i ∈ [n] and λ(L) ≤ ‖v1‖ ≤ 2nλ(L). Moreover, if (v∗1 , . . . , v∗n) is the
dual basis, then ‖v∗i ‖ ≤
√
n
λ(L)2
2n for all i ∈ [n].
Proof: Let (v†1, . . . , v
†
n) denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of (v1, . . . , vn), i.e., v
†
i is the
component of vi orthogonal to the subspace spanned by v1, . . . , vi−1. Clearly, 〈v†i , vj〉 = 0 for i > j.
Recall that in an LLL reduced basis ‖v†i ‖ ≤
√
2‖v†i+1‖ and for i < j,
∣∣∣〈v†i , vj〉
∣∣∣ ≤ 12‖v†i ‖2. In
addition, recall that mini ‖v†i ‖ is a lower bound on λ(L). Then for any i ∈ [n], ‖v†1‖ ≤ 2(i−1)/2‖v†i ‖
and therefore ‖v†1‖ ≤ 2(n−1)/2λ(L). But since v†1 = v1 we see that λ(L) ≤ ‖v1‖ ≤ 2nλ(L). Consider
the representation of (v1, . . . , vn) in the orthonormal basis (v
†
1/‖v†1‖, . . . , v†n/‖v†n‖). It is given by the
columns of the matrix B = (bi,j)1≤i,j≤n where bi,j = 〈vj , v†i 〉/‖v†i ‖. Notice that this matrix is upper
triangular and that its diagonal is bi,i = ‖v†i ‖. Also note that by the properties of an LLL reduced
basis, |bi,j | ≤ 12‖v†i ‖ for i < j. The shortest vector is
∑n
i=1 aivi =
∑n
i=1(
∑n
j=i ajbi,j)v
†
i /‖v†i ‖. Since
its length is at most 2n‖v†i ‖ the absolute value of each of its coordinates is at most 2n‖v†i ‖. Hence,∣∣∣∑nj=i ajbi,j
∣∣∣ ≤ 2n‖v†i ‖ for every i ∈ [n]. By taking i = n we get that |anbn,n| ≤ 2n‖v†n‖ and hence
|an| is at most 2n. We continue inductively and show that |ak| ≤ 22n−k. Assume that the claim
holds for ak+1, . . . , an. Then, |
∑n
j=k+1 ajbk,j| ≤ 12 |
∑n
j=k+1 aj |‖v†k‖ ≤ 12 (
∑n
j=k+1 2
2n−j)‖v†k‖ ≤
1
2 · 22n−k‖v†k‖. By the triangle inequality, |akbk,k| ≤ |
∑n
j=k+1 ajbk,j| + |
∑n
j=k ajbk,j| ≤ (1222n−k +
2n)‖v†k‖ ≤ 22n−k‖v†k‖ and the proof of the first part is completed.
The basis of the dual lattice is given by the columns of (BT )−1. Since mini |bi,i| ≥ λ(L)2n and
|bi,j| ≤ 12 |bi,i|, Claim A.7 implies that the entries of (BT )−1 are at most 1λ(L)22n in absolute value.
Therefore, the length of each column vector is at most
√
n
λ(L)2
2n.
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